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      Abstract-A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a 
group of wireless nods that can be dynamically organized 
as a multi-hop packet radio network without using any 
existing infrastructure or centralized administration. 
However, MANET is venerable to attacks due to its 
mobile and ad hoc natures. The security issue is becoming 
a main concern in the applications of MANET. We 
consider the problem of decreasing the number of false 
positives generated by cooperative Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) in Mobile Ad hoc Networks. In order to 
overcome the shortcomings of existing intrusion detection 
techniques, a hierarchical distributed model of multi-level 
detection intrusion is proposed. The model utilizes the 
intelligent, lightweight mobile agent as alternative to the 
client server distribution model and nonoverlapping zone 
framework. So it can effectively detect complicated 
attacks. The data collection, data analysis, alert message 
and alarm message can be achieved by using mobile 
agents, which may reduce the data transmission to save 
the bandwidth resource in the MANET. The model can 
adjust itself dynamically to adapt to the change of the 
external environmental. Also the model is robust and 
scalable. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
   The mobile ad hoc network is a network consisting of 
mobile nodes (mobile laptop computers, Personal 
Digital Assistants (PDAs) and wireless phones). They 
communicate with each other using wireless links and 
forming a temporary network   without the aid of an 
established infrastructure or centralized administration. 
Dependency and decentralized of MANET allows an 
adversary to exploit new type of attacks that are 
designed to destroy the cooperative algorithms used in 
ad hoc networks [6]. Moreover due to their open 
medium, dynamically changing network topology and 
lacking central monitoring and absence of a clear line 
of defense, MANET is particularly vulnerable to 
several types of attacks like passive eavesdropping, 
active impersonation, and denial of services. An 
intruder that compromises a mobile node in MANET 
can destroy the communication between the nodes by 
broadcasting false routing information, providing 
incorrect link state information, and overflowing other 
nodes with unnecessary routing traffic information [6].  
Therefore the existence and success of mobile ad hoc 
network will depend on users’ confidence in its 
security. The security research in MANET focused on 
key management, routing protocol and intrusion 
detection system [7], but past experiments have shown 
that encryption and authentication as intrusion 
prevention are not sufficient, and that more complex 
systems lead to more security problems [1]. 
On the other hand, intrusion detection techniques used 
in wired networks cannot be directly applied to mobile 
Ad Hoc networks due to special characteristics of the 
networks. Furthermore, most current MANET intrusion 
detection systems are still in the test stage [7]. Thus, to 
limit the damages caused by attacks and make the ad 
hoc network more secure, there is a need for intelligent 
intrusion detection systems and efficient automated 
response techniques. 
   In this paper, we are concerned with the design of 
intrusion detection system for MANET. Our goal is to 
design a new IDS architecture, derived from MANET 
requirements. In our proposed model, we use the 
autonomy and mobility associated with mobile agent 
technology to present an efficient and flexible system, 
to weak connectivity and inadequate bandwidth in 
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MANET environment [9]. Moreover, we propose a 
distributed multi-level (hierarchical) architecture. To 
detect intrusion by multilevel method, moreover using 
a hierarchical model will ensure the scalability of IDS.   
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the 
next section, we review some related work in intrusion 
detection for mobile Ad Hoc networks. In Section 3, 
we present and explain our intrusion detection scheme. 
In Section 4, we conclude this paper with a discussion 
on future work. 
 
 
II.      RELATED WORK 
 
A.  An IDS for MANET 
   The Intrusion Detection systems architecture for a 
wireless ad-hoc network may depend on the network 
infrastructure itself. Wireless ad-hoc networks may be 
configured in either a flat or multi-layered network 
infrastructure. In a flat network infrastructure, all nodes 
are equal; therefore it may be suitable to civilian 
applications such as virtual classrooms or conferences 
[8]. On the contrary, in the multi-layered network some 
nodes considered different. Nodes can be divided into 
clusters, with one clusterhead in each cluster. 
   In traditional wired networks, many intrusion 
detection systems have been implemented where 
switches, routers or gateways play key role to make 
IDS implemented in these devices easily [3]. But on the 
other hand these devices do not exist in MANET. For 
that reason several intrusion detection architectures 
proposed for ad hoc network include stand-alone IDS 
architecture, distributed and cooperative IDS 
architecture, and hierarchical IDS architecture [5].In a 
stand-alone Intrusion Detection System architecture, 
each node runs an   IDS  independently to detects 
malicious attacks and determine intrusions, Since 
stand-alone IDS do not cooperate or share information 
with other detection systems running on other nodes , 
all intrusion detection decisions are based on 
information available to the individual node. 
Furthermore nodes do not know anything about the 
situation on other nodes in the same network [8]. The 
watchdog mechanism could be deployed as a stand-
alone IDS architecture and detect intrusion nodes 
within transmission range, but do not report detected 
malicious nodes to any other node [5]. Stand-alone 
architecture is not effective enough but can be utilized 
in network where not all nodes are running IDS. 
   Zhang and Lee [1], proposed a distributed and 
cooperative intrusion detection architecture that is 
shown in figure 1, in this architecture each node runs 
an IDS agent and makes local detection decision 
independently, by monitoring activities such as user 
and system activities and the communication activities 
within the radio range. At the same time, all the nodes 
cooperate in a global detection decision making. [10] 
In this architecture, if IDS agent on any node detects an 
intrusion with weak or inconclusive evidence, it can 
initiate a cooperative global intrusion detection 
procedure or if a node detects locally an intrusion with 
strong evidence, it can independently determine an 
attack on the network. Similarly to stand-alone IDS 
architecture, distributed and cooperative intrusion 
detection system architecture is more suitable for flat 
network infrastructure and not multilayered network [2, 
9].Although distributed and cooperative IDS 
architecture can solve some limitations that exist in the 
stand-alone IDS architecture, it has the following 
problems. First, cooperative intrusion detection may 
lead to unnecessary communication and calculation 
between nodes in MANET, causing decrease in 
network performance. Second, the sharing data 
between trusted nodes is not in general true since there 





Figure 1: Distributed and Cooperative IDS in 
MANETs [1]. 
 
    Hierarchical Intrusion Detection Systems 
architectures have been designed for multi-layered ad 
hoc network infrastructures where the network is 
divided into clusters. Clusterheads (CH) of each cluster 
usually have more functionality than other node in the 
clusters, for example cluster-head nodes centralized 
routing for all nodes in the cluster and routing packets 
across clusters. Therefore, these cluster heads, act as 
manage points which are similar to switches, routers, or 
gateways in traditional wired networks. Each IDS agent 
runs on every node. Also it is responsible for detecting 
intrusion locally by monitoring local activities. A 
cluster head is responsible locally for its node as well 
as globally for its cluster, e.g. monitoring network 
packets and initiating a global response when network 
intrusion is detected [2,7]. 
   In the zone-based intrusion detection system 
(ZBIDS) [4], the ad hoc network is partitioned into   
non-overlapping zones. Node can be categorized into 
two types: the gateway node (inter-zone node) and the 
intra-zone node.  Every node in a zone sends an alert 
message to a gateway node with alert flooding and the 
gateway node will send out an alarm message at a fixed 
interval representing the zone [7]. Also the system does 
not use any inelegant mobile agent and have gateway 
nodes which work just like a cluster head [5]. 
   Furthermore, in MANET intrusion detection system 
there are two types of decision making including 
collaborative decision making and independent 
decision making. In collaborative decision making, 
each node participates actively in the intrusion 
detection procedure. Once one node detects an 
intrusion with strong confidence, this node can start a 
response to the intrusion by starting a majority voting 
to determine whether attack happens, like in [1]. On the 
other hand, in the independent decision making 
framework, certain nodes are assigned for intrusion 
detection [10]. These nodes collect intrusion alerts 
from other nodes and decide whether any node in the 
network is under attack [7, 5]. These nodes do not need 
other nodes’ participation in decision making. 
 
B.  Mobile Agent for Intrusion Detection Systems in 
MANET 
 
   Mobile agents are special kinds of software agents, 
which have the ability to move through large networks. 
Mobile agents have been used in several techniques for 
intrusion detection systems in MANETs. Due to its 
capability to travel through the large network, each 
mobile agent is assigned to only one specific task.  
Then one or more mobile agents are distributed into 
each ad hoc network node [10]. This allows the 
distribution of the intrusion detection tasks. Through 
travel, the agents can interact and cooperate with 
nodes, collect information, and perform tasks assigned 
to them. Opposed to traditional approaches where large 
amounts of data are transported towards the 
computation location, allows the analysis programs to 
move closer to the audit data. While providing a 
flexible way of distribution using mobile agents can 
reduce the amount of data traveled through the 
network. Moreover any node dispatching an agent 
doesn’t have to wait for it to return to resume the 
processing; any agent can be dispatched and even 
destroyed by other nodes, without having to go back to 
the creator node [9]. 
 
III. MOBILE AGENT IDS NON-OVERLAPPING ZONE 
ARCHITECTURE (MAZIDS) 
 
   In this section we describe first our intrusion 
detection system structure and then the procedure for 
intrusion detection. 
 
A.   Zone-Based Framework  
   MAZIDS is a distributed IDS, in which two levels of 
hierarchical structure are defined, it is designed using 
zone-based frame work, the whole ad hoc network is 
divided into non overlapping zones .We assume the 
existence of such a framework, and this could be done 
without difficulty based on techniques such as 
geographic partitioning [4]. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
there are two categories of nodes in MAZIDS: intra-
zone nodes and gateway nodes (inter-zone nodes).The 
node is called a gateway if it has connection to a node 
in the neighboring zone, Otherwise; it is called an intra-
zone node. In figure 2 zone 5, node 11, 10, 9 and 5 are 





Figure 2.  Zone-base framework of MAZIDS 
    
B.    Intrusion Detection System MAZIDS 
   To illustrate the system structure in our design in 
which there are two major components for each IDS, 
that is, GIDS (Gateway Intrusion Detection System) 
and LIDS (Local Intrusion Detection System). In the 
hierarchical MAZIDS architecture, every mobile node 
runs a LIDS locally to perform local data collection 
and anomaly detection and initiate local response , and 
only a subset of the nodes (gateway nods) will run 
GIDS and such nodes are organized in multiple layers. 
   Gateway Intrusion Detection System is shown in 
Figure 3, which contains the Zone Manager Agent 
(MA), it is in charge of harmonizing all the activities 
among the models, such as Global Detection Agent 
(GDA), Global Response Agents (GRA), Global 
Cooperative Agents (GCA), also performing all the 
communications between   LIDS Agents Framework 
and GIDS models. 
 
 
     
Figure 3.  Architecture of   MAZIDS 
 
    Zone manager agent is the heart of the controlling 
and coordinating with every agent in the zone. It 
maintains the configuration of the agents, record the 
system status information of each component, make the 
decisions that make other agents work on their duty. 
Like in [4] we use alerts to indicate a potential security 
attack recognized by local IDS agents, while global 
alarms are finalized decisions made by GIDS. When a 
node detects locally an intrusion with strong evidence, 
depending on some threshold value, the node can 
initiate a Local Alarm, by sending alarm message to the 
nearest gateway node GIDS, which in turn triggers 
local and global response model. This actually starts 
local response agent and global response agent. After 
that, the manager agent stores this alarm in the long 
term memory (LTM). However, if a node detects 
intrusion with weak or inconclusive evidence, the node 
initiates Local Alert to the nearest gateway node GIDS, 
which directly starts local and global cooperative 
intrusion detection procedure, as well as global 
detection agent GDA to search for new evidence in 
long term memory and short term memory, and if there 
is any good evidence, it initiates global and local 
response model. The short term memory is used to 
store alerts that dose not convert to alarm, in order to 
be used in future detection process.                                   
  If GIDS receive the same   alerts from several LIDS, 
this alert will be treated special way in GDA. Also the 
global alarm communications among zones is 
accomplished through manager agents, which share 
information among different security gateway intrusion 




   This paper presents the new hierarchical distributed 
intrusion detection system for MANET, using 
lightweight mobile agent as alternative to the client 
server distribution model, in nonoverlapping zone 
framework. This fits the distributed nature of MANET. 
Because the model utilizes the gateway nodes, it is 
supposed to make ad hoc network more efficient by 
limiting the resources usage for intrusion detection 
purposes on only some nodes.  
   We classify the detected events into two types, strong 
and weak events. And then gave a special process for 
each of them, the weak alert go in three levels of 
processing, this is the node level, zone level and 
network level.  By this procedure we improve intrusion 
detection rate and reduce false alarm rate. This is the 
key performance indicator of intrusion detection system 
in ad hoc network. The data collection, data analysis, 
alert message and alarm message can be achieved by 
using mobile agents, which may reduce the data 
transmission to save the bandwidth resource in the 
MANET. 
    The system that we presented in this paper only 
represents our first work for the development of a 
complicated IDS for MANET. As the future work to 
accomplish our final objective, we plan to develop 
anomaly detection system based on this model. In 
addition, we have argued that our hierarchical 
distributed intrusion detection system is more 
beneficial over most existing models in terms of 
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